Transdisciplinary approaches are increasingly essential for addressing grand societal challenges, particularly in complex domains such as Artificial Intelligence (AI), urban planning, and social sciences. However, effectively validating and integrating knowledge across distinct epistemic and ontological perspectives poses significant difficulties. This article proposes a six-dimensional framework for assessing and strengthening transdisciplinary knowledge validity in AI and city studies, based on an extensive analysis of the most cited research (2014--2024). Specifically, the framework classifies research orientations according to ontological, epistemological, methodological, teleological, axiological, and valorization dimensions. Our findings show a predominance of perspectives aligned with critical realism (ontological), positivism (epistemological), analytical methods (methodological), consequentialism (teleological), epistemic values (axiological), and social/economic valorization. Less common stances, such as idealism, mixed methods, and cultural valorization, are also examined for their potential to enrich knowledge production. We highlight how early career researchers and transdisciplinary teams can leverage this framework to reconcile divergent disciplinary viewpoints and promote socially accountable outcomes.

I am a person and so are you. Philosophically we sometimes grant personhood to non-human animals, and entities such as sovereign states or corporations can legally be considered persons. But when, if ever, should we ascribe personhood to AI systems? In this paper, we outline necessary conditions for AI personhood, focusing on agency, theory-of-mind, and self-awareness. We discuss evidence from the machine learning literature regarding the extent to which contemporary AI systems, such as language models, satisfy these conditions, finding the evidence surprisingly inconclusive. If AI systems can be considered persons, then typical framings of AI alignment may be incomplete. Whereas agency has been discussed at length in the literature, other aspects of personhood have been relatively neglected. AI agents are often assumed to pursue fixed goals, but AI persons may be self-aware enough to reflect on their aims, values, and positions in the world and thereby induce their goals to change. We highlight open research directions to advance the understanding of AI personhood and its relevance to alignment. Finally, we reflect on the ethical considerations surrounding the treatment of AI systems. If AI systems are persons, then seeking control and alignment may be ethically untenable.

The precise definition of causality is currently an open problem in philosophy and statistics. We believe causality should be defined as functions (in mathematics) that map causes to effects. We propose a reductive definition of causality based on Structural Functional Model (SFM). Using delta compression and contrastive forward inference, SFM can produce causal utterances like "X causes Y" and "X is the cause of Y" that match our intuitions. We compile a dataset of causal scenarios and use SFM in all of them. SFM is compatible with but not reducible to probability theory. We also compare SFM with other theories of causation and apply SFM to downstream problems like free will, causal explanation, and mental causation.

We integrate foundational theories of meaning with a mathematical formalism of artificial general intelligence (AGI) to offer a comprehensive mechanistic explanation of meaning, communication, and symbol emergence. This synthesis holds significance for both AGI and broader debates concerning the nature of language, as it unifies pragmatics, logical truth conditional semantics, Peircean semiotics, and a computable model of enactive cognition, addressing phenomena that have traditionally evaded mechanistic explanation. By examining the conditions under which a machine can generate meaningful utterances or comprehend human meaning, we establish that the current generation of language models do not possess the same understanding of meaning as humans nor intend any meaning that we might attribute to their responses. To address this, we propose simulating human feelings and optimising models to construct weak representations. Our findings shed light on the relationship between meaning and intelligence, and how we can build machines that comprehend and intend meaning.

Scientific understanding is a fundamental goal of science, allowing us to explain the world. There is currently no good way to measure the scientific understanding of agents, whether these be humans or Artificial Intelligence systems. Without a clear benchmark, it is challenging to evaluate and compare different levels of and approaches to scientific understanding. In this Roadmap, we propose a framework to create a benchmark for scientific understanding, utilizing tools from philosophy of science. We adopt a behavioral notion according to which genuine understanding should be recognized as an ability to perform certain tasks. We extend this notion by considering a set of questions that can gauge different levels of scientific understanding, covering information retrieval, the capability to arrange information to produce an explanation, and the ability to infer how things would be different under different circumstances. The Scientific Understanding Benchmark (SUB), which is formed by a set of these tests, allows for the evaluation and comparison of different approaches. Benchmarking plays a crucial role in establishing trust, ensuring quality control, and providing a basis for performance evaluation. By aligning machine and human scientific understanding we can improve their utility, ultimately advancing scientific understanding and helping to discover new insights within machines.

Ever since the creation of the first artificial intelligence (AI) machinery built on machine learning (ML), public society has entertained the idea that eventually computers could become sentient and develop a consciousness of their own. As these models now get increasingly better and convincingly more anthropomorphic, even some engineers have started to believe that AI might become conscious, which would result in serious social consequences. The present paper argues against the plausibility of sentient AI primarily based on the theory of neurogenetic structuralism, which claims that the physiology of biological neurons and their structural organization into complex brains are necessary prerequisites for true consciousness to emerge.

Artificial intelligence (AI) assisting with antimicrobial prescribing raises significant moral questions. Utilising ethical frameworks alongside AI-driven systems, while considering infection specific complexities, can support moral decision making to tackle antimicrobial resistance.

The following defines intent, an arbitrary task and its solutions, and then argues that an agent which always constructs what is called an Intensional Solution would qualify as artificial general intelligence. We then explain how natural language may emerge and be acquired by such an agent, conferring the ability to model the intent of other individuals labouring under similar compulsions, because an abstract symbol system and the solution to a task are one and the same.

Artificial intelligence (AI) is the field devoted to building artificial animals (or at least artificial creatures that – in suitable contexts – appear to be animals) and, for many, artificial persons (or at least artificial creatures that – in suitable contexts – appear to be persons).[1] Such goals immediately ensure that AI is a discipline of considerable interest to many philosophers, and this has been confirmed (e.g.) by the energetic attempt, on the part of numerous philosophers, to show that these goals are in fact un/attainable. On the constructive side, many of the core formalisms and techniques used in AI come out of, and are indeed still much used and refined in, philosophy: first-order logic and its extensions; intensional logics suitable for the modeling of doxastic attitudes and deontic reasoning; inductive logic, probability theory, and probabilistic reasoning; practical reasoning and planning, and so on. In light of this, some philosophers conduct AI research and development as philosophy. In the present entry, the history of AI is briefly recounted, proposed definitions of the field are discussed, and an overview of the field is provided.

Ethical concern about technology enjoys booming popularity, evident in worry over artificial intelligence, threats to privacy, the digital divide, reliability of research results, and vulnerability of software. Concern over software shows in cybersecurity efforts and professional codes.1 The black hats are hackers who deploy software as a weapon with malicious intent, and the white hats are the organizations that set safeguards against defective products. But we have a gray-hat problem--neglect. My impression is that the criteria under which I used to assess student programs--rigorous thought, design, and testing, clean nested conditions, meaningful variable names, complete case coverage, careful modularization--have been abandoned or weakened.